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Globalisation:
The Challenge for National Economic Regimes
1 Introduction
At the outset of my presentation, I would like to say how
honoured I am to be presenting the Geary Lecture for 1993. I am
honoured, first, to be following in the footsteps of such a
distinguished panel of speakers; second to be associated with
Ireland’s most prestigious research institute; the third, to further
commemorate the memory and splendid achievements of the
founder director of The Economic and Social Research Institute -
Dr Robert Geary.
The role of government, as an organising force in a market
economy, is coming under increasing scrutiny. Yet, in spite of an
almost universal eagerness to contain or reduce the extent of
governmental intervention in the management of domestic
resource allocation, it remains a fact that the countries which have
recorded the most impressive economic performances over the
past two decades are those whose governments have exerted a
strong and positive influences over all aspects of commercial
affairs1.
My lecture today addresses just one, but an increasingly
important, aspect of this enigma, viz the implications of the
globalisation of business activity for the economic sovereignty of
individual nation states. In particular, I propose to consider the
implications of the globalisation of business activity for the
organisation and management of location bound human and
physical assets. I shall argue that the pace and direction of
1 The concept of strong and positive government does not necessarily imply there
should be substantial government intervention in economic affairs. Indeed, a recent
IMF study (Ostry, 1993) of East Asia’s experience suggests there is little evidence to
suggest that even "selective" interventionism is correlated with superior growth
performance. Instead, high domestic savings and investment rates, an emphasis on
the upgrading of human capital, flexible labour markets and an unrestricted access
to foreign resources, capabilities and markets are among the shared factors in the
success of the Asian economies. However, it is our contention that, by their macro-
economic and organisational strategies, governments may play a critical role in
influencing the value of these, and other, competitive enhancing variables.
technological, political and institutional change, especially as it has
affected the extent and character of international transactions, is
demanding a systematic recasting of the traditional role of national
governments as custodians of the economic welfare of the citizens
within their jurisdiction.
Central to my thesis is the premise that, as a result of the
dramatic growth in the cross-border linkages forged by
multinational enterprises (MNEs) or transnational corporations
(TNCs),2 the latitude for autonomous and purely domestic
oriented actions on the part of the governments of nation states -
by which I mean actions which only affect the constituents of those
states and not those of others - is being severely curtailed.
Increasingly, too, national authorities - particularly those of the
advanced industrial countries - are competing with each other for a
share of the world’s supply of technological and organisational
capacity, and for the global economic rents of international
production. Given this scenario, both the economic sovereignty of
governments and the efficacy of their policy instruments for
affecting domestic wealth creating activities are being called into
question.3
My presentation will be divided into three parts. First, I
shall briefly outline the main features of the global economy now
emerging, and the reasons why globalisation is likely to continue
for the foreseeable future. Second, I shall discuss the implications
of globalisation - and, in particular, the cross-border activities of
MNEs - for governments, and for the organisation of economic
activity for which they are responsible. The third part of my
presentation ismore normative in that it speculates a little about
what some of the responses of national governments should be to
globalisation. Although, clearly, these responses will vary between
2 I use these terms interchangeably with each other.
3 Teece (1992) has pleaded for a re-evaluation of the role of the corporation in the
light of the global economy; my analysis argues for a similar reconceptualisation of
tile role of government.
countries according, for example, to their size, industrial
structures, institutional regimes, cultures and stages of
development, I believe there are some general implications for the
behaviour of all governments; and it is to these, rather than the
more country specific consequences of globalisation, to which I
wish to address my thoughts today.
2 The Main Features of Economic Globalisation
While scholars and business practitioners continue to
debate the meaning of the terms "global business" and the "global
economy", there is less disagreement about globalisation as a process
towards the widening of the extent and form of cross-border
transactions; and of the deepening of the economic
interdependence between the actions of globalising entities - be
they private or public institutions or governments - located in one
country and those of related or independent entities located in
other countries.
The shallowest form of globalisation - if that is not a
misnomer for the term - is where an economic entity in one
country engages in arm’s length trade in a single product with
another economic entity in one other country. The deepest form of
globalisation - and it is here we can most easily distinguish
globalisation from other forms of internationalisation - is where an
economic entity transacts with a large number of other economic
entities throughout the world; where it does so across a network of
value added chains;4 where these exchanges are highly co-
ordinated to serve the worldwide interests of the globalising entity;
and where they consist of a myriad of different kinds or forms of
transactions.
In practice, few firms - for that matter - or countries engage
in either the shallowest or deepest forms of globalisation. However,
each of us, I am sure, could quite readily identify a number of
firms or countries which are towards the bottom or top of the
4 There are various other expressions which, like globalisation, are difficult to
define precisely. Interdependence and integration are two of these.
globalisation spectrum. More to the point of my present interest,
however, is the almost universal trend towards the deeper
internationalisation of economy activity. The structure of the world
economy is, indeed, very difficult today than it was even a
generation ago.5 I would, in particular, emphasise three features.
First, the significance (and scope) of all kinds of cross-border
transactions has greatly increased. For example, as a proportion of
world gross national product (GNP), such transactions have more
than doubled since 1970.6 Second, the value of the foreign
production of firms, i.e., production financed by foreign direct
investment (FDI), and that arising from cross-border strategic
alliances - both of which are deeper forms of internationalisation
than that of arm’s length trade - now considerably exceeds that of
trade.7 And third, there are a variety of signs that the organisation
of international transactions, particularly among the largest MNEs,
has become both more systemic and geographically integrated
(UNCTAD, 1993).
It is, of course, true that the pace and pattern of
globalisation has been very uneven among firms, sectors and
countries. Indeed, since many of the features of globalisation just
described are principally applicable to members of, the Triad
nations, some scholars (Morrison, Ricks and Roth, 1991) have
argued that the term regionalisation better describes the current
stage of development. This may well be the case; certainly, intra-
regional transactions of all kinds in Europe, America and Asia have
risen faster than inter-regional transactions. It is also true that
certain parts of the world, notably sub-Saharan Africa, have been
relatively unaffected by globalisation.
5 Some writers, indeed, Drucker (1989), trace the evolution of the globalisation of
economic activity back to the 13th century.
6 In the US, for example, the percentage of GNP accounted for by trade rose from
7 per cent to 26 per cent between 1970 and 1990, while that accounted for by the
stock of inward and outward direct investment increased from 89 per cent to 156 per
cent.
7 Latest figures published by UNCTAD (1993) suggest that in 1993 the sales of the
foreign affiliates of MNEs amounted to $5.5 trillion compared with that of trade of
goods and services of $4.0 trillion.
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Finally, since globalisation has been largely driven by events
in the industrialised nations, it is understandable that - up to now,
at any rate - its greatest impact should have been felt in these
countries. But, like ripples in a pond, regionalisation may spread
outwards, initially to the immediate hinterland of the developed
countries, but then further as this hinterland generates its own
momentum of growth. Neither should one overlook the surge of
autonomous development within certain parts of the developing
world - particularly in East Asia and parts of Latin America. Indeed,
with growth rates in the advanced countries slipping, international
transactions involving developing countries have risen faster in the
last three years than those internal to the Triad countries. The
critical issue - to which we shall return later in this presentation - is
whether regionalisation will develop into a form of regionalism (a
kind of extended nationalism, with all that this implies) or is a step
- a phase - in the globalisation process.
3 Explaining Globalisation
The movement towards globalisation is essentially
technology driven.8 Admittedly, the tremendous growth in all
forms of international transactions over the last two or more
decades could not have taken place without the introduction
of new organisational structures within and between firms; or
the widespread restitution of the market system by many national
economies;9 or, indeed, without the removal of many obstacles
to intra-regional or international trade. But, these events, together
with the dramatic reduction in the time and costs of traversing
8 We use the world technology to embrace all forms of assets which make for the
more efficient development of resources and capabilities.
9 McKenzie and Lee (1991), for example, argue that the fall of Communism in
Central and Eastern Europe was triggered by economic, rather than political, forces
and, in particular, by the former’s impact on increasing inter-firm competition and
reducing cross-border psychic distance between the countries of the world.
space, have, themselves, been accelerated by techno-electronic
innovations, and their impact on the competitive pressures on
corporations to seek out new markets and conclude cross-border
cost reducing coalitions with other firms.
However, perhaps the most critical distinction between the
globalising economy of the 1990s and the international economy of
the 1980s rests in the nature of income generating assets. A century
ago the international division of labour was primarily based on the
spatial distribution of natural resources, such as the fruits of the
earth and untrained or semi-trained human capital. Today, the
capabilities of a country to produce wealth rests increasingly on the
extent to which it can create new resources or assets - such as
information, technological capacity, management techniques and
organisational competence. Particularly, in the western world,
where there is little population growth, it is the upgrading of the
quality of human and physical assets and the more efficient use of
existing assets - both natural and created - which is the critical
determinant of economic progress.
It is, perhaps, worth spending a moment or two considering
some of the implications of the growing importance of created,
relative to natural, assets in the wealth producing process. First, by
definition, created assets have to be produced. Unlike natural
resources, they are not God-given; they are man made and, in the
case of many created assets (e.g., a university, an airport and the
knowledge embodied in a new drug), they are very costly - both in
terms of human and physical capital - to produce.
Second, because of their intangibility, many created assets
are locationally mobile - although the degree of their mobility may
rest on the quality and cost of other, or complementary, assets, e.g.,
transport and communication facilities. Most kinds of knowledge,
information, professional skills, entrepreneurial talents and
organisational principles acknowledge no national borders, even
though there may be considerable costs incurred in transferring or
diffusing these assets between different cultures (Kogut and
Parkinson, 1993). The "quicksilver" character of both financial and
real assets is in marked contrast to the spatial fixity of many natural
assets - a fact which helped shape the Ricardian and neo-classical
theories of trade.
Third, created assets tend to be firm specific, i.e.,
proprietary to the firms producing them. In consequence, the
market for created assets is likely to be much more imperfect than
that for natural assets. Often created assets are the result of
successful innovations; but, for every successful innovation, there
are many more which are unsuccessful. To encourage firms to bear
the risks and uncertainties inherent in innovatory activities, and to
prevent the free-riding by competitors of successful innovations
which cost little to reproduce, society - or, more specifically,
government on behalf of society - has introduced various devices,
e.g., the patent system, either to counteract such market failures or
to reduce their net social costs.
Fourth, the markets for created assets tend to become more
imperfect as and when they cross national boundaries. This is
because the territorial expansion of firms into different political,
institutional and cultural regimes is likely to raise the transaction
costs of using such markets. Examples include the monitoring of
quality control, the protection of proprietary rights, and the
reduction of information asymmetries. Indeed, the desire to lower
cross-border transaction costs and to exploit the cross-border
economies of internal governance is one of the main reasons for
the recent rapid growth of MNE activity which has, itself, helped
sustain, or advance, globalisation.
Fifth, the conditions under which created assets are
produced and marketed are often strongly influenced by national
governments - and much more so than in the case of natural assets.
Sometimes, this is because governments - be they federal or state,
central or local -are the main producers of the assets; primary and
secondary educational services, roads and airports are examples.
Sometimes it reflects the quality of the legal and commercial
infrastructure they help provide; sometimes it is a direct result of
the economic strategies and policies they pursue; and sometimes it
is because of the general business climate and entrepreneurial
ethos they foster. Several writers, notably Wallis and North (1986)
and North (1993), have shown that, over the present century, these
government influenced production and transaction costs and
benefits have become a more important component of the total
costs of economic activity; and particularly so in those of
technology and information intensive manufacturing and service
sectors, which are the fastest growth points in the contemporary
global economy.
The net result of all these characteristics of created assets -
which, I repeat, though primarily a consequence of technological
change, is also affected by the way in which economic agents
respond to them - is that the determinants of the international
division of labour and of the optimum distribution of a nation’s
resources and assets are more affected by the behaviour of
hierarchies - and especially multinational hierarchies - and that of
national governments, than by that of pure or unadulterated (and I
use this word deliberately) market forces.
The globalising economy, then, is, first and foremost, an
expression of a new international division of labour. This new
division of labour is based increasingly on the way in which
countries and firms are able to engineer the production of new
income generating assets, and to combine these with location
bound natural resources - tile quantity and quality of which, itself, is
influenced by the policies and strategies of governments. It also
comprises a network of imperfect intermediate product markets
Which are frequently under the common governance of multi-
activity enterprises. The key wealth creating actor in this scenario is
the MNE, which is also the main determining institution of the
spatial distribution of created assets. By internalising the market for
the intermediate products it wishes to acquire or use, and co-
ordinating its markets throughout the world, it brings about a
different pattern of resource allocation than that which would have
been dictated by purely market forces.
4 Multinationals and National Governments
The relationship between international companies and
national governments has always been an uneasy, if not a
schizophrenic, one. This is primarily because, while MNEs normally
aim to maximise the economic rent on their global activities,
governments are more concerned with maximising the value added
created by MNEs and particularly that part of which is retained within
their national boundaries. Moreover, because of their wider locational
options, MNEs are frequently perceived to possess more bargaining
power than national governments. Frequently, in the past, MNEs
have been targeted for criticism by host countries for attempting to
extract an unacceptably large share of the value added they - the
MNEs - have helped create; or for not engaging in the kind of
economic activity which is perceived to be in the best long-term
interests of the country. Similarly, home countries have been
anxious lest MNEs should export jobs, worsen the balance of
payments or, by transferring technology to foreign competitors,
inhibit the upgrading of their own resources and capabilities.
At the same time, both host and home governments well
recognise the benefits which MNE activity may confer. To host
countries, MNEs being new technologies, management skills, access
to markets and organisational capabilities. They may inject new
entrepreneurial cultures, competitive stimuli and working
procedures. By their procurement practices and marketing and
distribution techniques, they may help elevate the capabilities of
their suppliers and raise the productivity of their industrial
customers. To home countries, MNEs may not only earn valuable
investment income and open up new markets, but they are the
principal means of tapping into and monitoring the competitive
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advantages of foreign firms and countries.10
The last 100 years is a story of the ambivalent and shifting
attitudes of governments (particularly host governments) towards
the perceived costs and benefits of MNE activity. In retrospect, a
kind of Kondratieff long-wave cycle seems to have been at work.
Inbound investment has been particularly welcomed at times of
strong market oriented economic growth, and when the need for
the innovating and competitiveness enhancing qualities of FDI has
been especially marked. Such was the case in the late 19th and early
20th century, the 1960s and the late 1980s.
By contrast, it has been less enthusiastically acclaimed when
the perceived need for its unique qualities has been less pressing,
and where host governments have been pursuing market distorting
or self-reliant economic policies; or where there has been a
particular sensitivity to the strategic or cultural impact of MNE
activity. The inter-war years and the 1970s saw one or other of these
attitudes holding strong and, to a certain extent, they are currently
reflected in the less than cordial response by some US interest
groups to Japanese inbound investment.11 Similarly, but I shall not
do more than mention these, there have been periods, dating back
at least to the first part of the 19th century, when the attitude of
governments towards outbound MNE activity has been very
restrictive.12
For the most part, however, the reactions of governments in
the 1990s to MNE activity fall into the first category. According to a
study published by the UNCTC in 1991 (UNCTC, 1991), more than
10 Tile role of MNEs in upgrading the competitive advantages of both home and
host countries is described by several writers in a special edition of Management
Inten, ational Reviao, edited by Alan Rugman and published in Spring 1993.
11 Going even further back in history, anxieties were expressed by American
businessmen and statesmen in the last quarter of the 19th century about the possible
takeover of large segments of US industry and agriculture - particularly in California
and Colorado - by British interests (Wilkins, 1989).
12 These are more fully described in Dunning (1993a).
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80 countries have liberalised their policies towards inward direct
investment since the mid-1970s. At two conferences at which I
presented papers earlier in 1993 - the one attended by Central and
East European parliamentarians in Warsaw and the other by
Chinese officials in Beijing, not a single voice (apart from mine)
was raised about the costs of FDI. The only concern of the
participants was how to best attract as much inbound MNE activity
as possible. In parenthesis, I would observe that China, in its
gradualist adoption of a market economy,13 has been considerably
more successful in gaining new FDI than the erstwhile Soviet Union
and its satellites, in their whirlwind embracement of capitalism! By
the end of 1992, China was not only attracting more inbound MNE
activity than any other developing country; but the stock of inward
FDI (at $40 billion) was 2-3 times that in the whole of Central and
Eastern Europe (UNCTAD, 1993).
Of the several reasons for the change in governmental
attitudes toward MNE activity since the 1970s, two deserve special
mention. The first is the deceleration of economic growth and
increasing unemployment in most countries of the world, which,
coupled with the implementation of new labour and materials
saving technologies and the increased mobility of intangible assets
made possible by telecommunication advances, has added to the
pressure on countries to seek the ingredients of competitiveness
and growth from wherever they can. The second factor is the
opening up and development of new territories - especialy in East
Asia - which has meant that the locational options open to MNEs
have widened. These options have occurred at a time when global
competitive pressures have impelled firms - especially MNEs - to be
more adventurous in seeking out the most cost efficient locations
for their value added activities, and to form an increasing number
and variety of cross-border alliances.
13 What it chooses to call a "socialist" market economy.
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At the same time, there has been some reprioritisation of
the objectives of governments. From an emphasis on political and
domestic oriented objectives in the 1960s and 1970s, the lens of
governments have been refocused towards identifying and
deploying every means by which competitiveness of their firms and
their location bound resources may be enhanced; although the
renewed quest for cultural autonomy and the growing resurgence
of ethnic fruitions and tribalistic sentiments within nation states
(possibly a reaction to the trend towards the harmonisation of
economic values) may well demand much more attention by
governments in the next two decades or more.14 In so doing and
in recognising the innate mobility of many created assets, national
authorities have begun to accept that, to best achieve their social
objectives, they have to offer at least as attractive opportunities for
the production and marketing of goods and services as do their
main competitors; and to ensure that their domestic macro-
economic and organisational policies are such that both their own
and foreign firms - in following the dictates of a demanding and
dynamic global market economy - are induced to invest in
upgrading the kind of value activities best suited to the dynamic
comparative advantages of their resources and capabilities.
Most certainly, one of the mistakes many governments
made in the 1970s and early 1980s was to try to force MNEs and
their affiliates to accept the mould of established economic
policies, and to extract penalties on those who did not. Often, the
imposition of further market distorting programmes not only did
more harm than good, but soured the relations between MNEs and
governments. Today it is recognised that in a world which is
technologically force majeure, becoming economically
interdependent and, for the most part, driven by international
capitalism, the pursuance of domestic policies which are out of line
14 For example,John Naisbitt, the author of Megatrends 2000, has argued in his new
book Global Paradox (to be published in 1994) that, in the next 20 years or so, the
number of sovereign states will dramatically increase from its present (1993)
number of just under 200 to upwards of 500.
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with those of one’s major competitors, is an unaffordable luxury.
But - and here is the point I want to stress - although, in the 1980s,
the inappropriateness of some government strategies was becoming
sharply exposed by the activities of MNEs, such activities were not
the primary cause. MNEs do, indeed, respond to the imperatives of
the globalising marketplace. But, although they are the main agents
of change, they do not, alone, determine the consequences and
shape of that change. This responsibility is shared by the macro-
economic and organisational systems devised and implemented by
governments, and by international economic regimes, e.g., GATT
and the IME In considering, then, the shift currently taking place
in national government policies towards MNEs, it is necessary to
look beyond the determinants and outcome of the latter’s activities
- and toward the implications of the globalising economy per se.
5 The Changing Role of National Governments
I have suggested that globalisation - and its main enabling
vehicle - the telematics revolution - is dramatically encapsulating
space, and by so doing, is linking national economies in a way
undreamed of by our forefathers. In addition, since economic
growth is increasingly dependent on the enhancement and
disposition of mobile created, rather than location bound, natural
assets, it follows that there is much more inter-country competition
for the former and their products than for the latter and their
products.
At the time of David Ricardo, i.e., the early years of the 19th
century, it was possible to draw a clear dividing line between the
foreign and domestic economic policies of national governments.
As regards the former, the debate largely centred about the merits
of protectionism in those cases where foreign competition was
perceived to be damaging - or potentially damaging.
Not surprisingly, the stance taken by countries rested on
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their relative pecking orders in the development stakes; and also
the lobbying power of firms from those sectors most likely to be
adversely affected by trade liberalisation. But, in general, the "near"
free traders - like the UK- recommend little government
intervention, as long as countries produced and argued strongly -
and produced efficiently- that all countries should produce those
goods and services which required resources in which they
possessed a comparative advantage, and exchanged those for others
requiring resources in which they were comparatively
disadvantaged. The preferred organisational route for achieving
this goal was the unfettered market, with national governments
only intervening when the market was thought to operate
inefficiently or unfairly, or where the barriers to entry into socially
beneficial economic activities were too high for private investors to
bear.
However, with one major exception, resources and
capabilities were assumed to be location bound within national
borders. Since, too, domestic firms could not "escape" from
unwelcome fiscal, competition, environmental, transport or energy
related policies of governments - nor foreign firms be tempted to
take advantage of more favourable policies - the only constraint on
the behaviour of governments was that of the demands of foreign
countries and the supply capabilities of foreign producers via trade;
and even here the connection was an indirect one. The one
exception was the price of finance capital - the one created asset
that was able to flow freely across national boundaries. Hence, the
argument later put forward by economists such as Robert Mundell
(1957) that trade in capital and goods were largely substitutable for
each other: In such a scenario, national governments could pursue
domestic economic and social policies largely independent of each
other without fear or favour that these policies would provoke
undesirable reactions by other governments. And, in point of fact,
for much of recent economic history, such policies have differed
greatly both between countries, and in the same country at
different periods of time.
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In the globalising world of the 1990s, the options open to
national administrations are much more constrained. Primarily
because of the easy movement of the critical wealth creating assets,
and the fact that there is more intensive competition among nation
states to produce similar goods and services than once there was,
the domestic economic strategies of national governments are
more closely intertwined than once they were. This is because of
the widening choice of the owners of the mobile assets as to the
location of their production and usage. Thus, in pursuance of
legitimate domestic objectives, if the government of one country
imposes too high a corporation tax, firms - be they domestic or
foreign - may decide to relocate their value added activities in
another country where taxes are lower; or, in considering where to
site their new plants, firms may choose that country with the least
burdensome environmental constraints, or whose government
pursues the most favourable industrial policy, or which offers the
most advanced telecommunication facilities or the most attractive
tax breaks for R&D activities. Indeed, as several economists, notably
Guisinger and associates (1985), have shown, anything and
everything a government does which affects the competitiveness of
those firms which have some latitude in their cross-border
locational choices must come under scrutiny. In such cases, the
boundaries of domestic economic jurisdiction becomes blurred. And, because
of this, one of the critical assumptions underlying the behaviour of any
government - viz its autonomy in the framing and implementation of its
economic strategy - is no longer valid. The mould is broken; it needs to be
recast.
The last 20 or more years have seen a growing recognition
by the leading industrial nations of the need for some co-
ordination in their macro-economic policies to avoid counter-
productive domestic monetary and fiscal policies, and to cushion
the adverse effect of shocks to an increasingly volatile international
financial system. Though the Oroup of Seven has had some success in
this area - and, indeed, it may be argued that the decisions of this
informal group of leaders has exerted more influence on the
15
domestic macro-economic policies of the Triad nations than the
actions of more formal supra-national regimes, e.g., EC, World
Bank, etc. - the recent fragility of European currencies vividly
demonstrates some of the difficulties of maintaining a unified
exchange mectlanism, where the member countries vary in
economic well-being or are faced with different economic and
social needs. When the crunch comes, national interests always
seem to triumph over regional or international interests.
More recently, the attempt to widen the terms of reference
of GATT, notably to embrace issues relating to FDI and competition
policy, is, perhaps, the most explicit acknowledgement that the
domestic economic programmes of national governments can and
do affect the playing field of international transactions; and that
market distorting industrial and other policies (known as TRIMS)15
may be as damaging to the level and direction of world trade as any
tariff or non-tariff barriers. Once again, as in many other issues -
notably the initiation of EC 1992 - MNEs, through such institutions
as the European Round Table and UNICE (Union of Industrial and
Employers Confederation) have played a critical role (Cowles,
1983). More than most other economic agents, they - the MNEs -
understand the implications of the gamut of legislation and policies
- designed by governments to advance their own political and
economic goals - not just on their own competitive position in
international markets, but on how, in turn, these measures may
induce a reaction from other governments.
The idea that governments, like firms - and on behalf of
their constituents - compete with each other for resources and
markets, and that, like firms, they may behave as oligopolists in
their rent seeking activities, is one which has, so far, gained only
limited intellectual support. This is particularly so among neo-
classical economists who believe that firms are the sole wealth
15 Trade Related Investment Measures
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creators in society; and that the role of government is simply (sic)
to provide the legal and commercial backdrop to the market
allocative mechanism, which alone and unaided, should provide
the signals as to what should be produced, how it should be
produced, who should produce it and where it should be produced.
The idea of a UK, US or Ireland Ltd smacks too much of
corporatism, and of the kind of economic interventionism which,
in the past, has proved to be less effective than the imperfect
markets which it sought to replace. In particular - so it is argued -
the experiences of Central and Eastern Europe, over the past 40 or
more years, have shown that there is an unacceptable face of
government just as there is an unacceptable face of the market
place.
Yet, there can be no escaping the fact that in our complex
and interdependent global village, markets do not always operate
costlessly efficiently,16 neither can one deny that in social
democracies, the government of the day is accountable to the
electorate for its conduct of the economy, just as it is responsible
for defence, law and order, the environment and public
administration, and for the protection of the less able and less
fortunate members of society. Indeed, there is a parallel between
the task of the elected authority to protect its citizens against
military conquest or unacceptable political intervention and that of
the sustenance of its economic security.17 In conditions of
economic isolation, this latter task is a minimal one. In the text
book world of a simple division of labour, perfect markets,
immobile resources and complementary trade and production,
there is little need for governments to intervene with the decisions
of producers and consumers. But, this is not the global economic
scenario of the 1990s. Countries and firms are intricately linked
with each other. Resources are mobile. Governments do compete
16 This was recognised by Emile Durkheim in 1893, when he stated that increasing
internationalisation and division of labour in a society - the hallmarks of economic
progress - leads to the "accumulation of government tasks" (Durkheim, 1964, pp.
219-226).
17 Indeed, in the past, many wars have been fought to preserve or advance such
security.
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with each other. The division of labour is making for more, rather
than less, interdependence of economic activities and more, rather
than less, asset specificity. And, markets do not always perform in the
way that neo-classical economists like to think they should.
The literature on the rationale of government intervention
to overcome or mitigate the inability of markets to fully optimise
economic welfare is substantial and growing. It is also quite recent,
although many of the justifications for government intervention
date back to the time of A.C. Pigou and beyond. Economists today
argue that there are three main reasons why governments may wish
to intervene in markets.18 The first - and one which I will not
address in any detail in this presentation - is to achieve goals other
than the efficient use of resources - notably to advance social,
political or cultural mores - which the market system, is not (and
never was), Set up to achieve. This form of intervention by
government is only relevant in the present context in so far as the
money spent on the attainment of social goals may (I repeat, may,
not necessarily will) be at the cost of maintaining or upgrading a
country’s competitiveness in international markets, and, hence, the
resources available to support social objectives in a future period of
time. In other words, the competitiveness of US, British, German or
Irish firms relative to their foreign competitors in period 1 will - in
part at least - determine how much the US, British, German or Irish
governments can affbrd to spend on social welfare in period 2.
The right, or optimum, balance of allocating a country’s
resources and capabilities between wealth crea0ng and other
welfare enhancing activities cannot be decided on economic
grounds alone; moreover it is likely to be highly country specific.
18 The’literature on this subject is extensive. For some recent contributions to the
debate, see Aaron and Schultze (1992) Audretsch (1989), Colclough and Manor
(1991), Krueger (1990), McKenzie and Lee (1991), Ostry (1990), Stopford and
Strange (1991) and Wolf (1988). For an analysis of the changing balance between
the role of governments, hierarchies and markets as economic development
proceeds, see Dunning (1993b), and Hfimfilfdnen (1994) and National Academy of
Engineering (1993).
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However, in comparing the economic performances of nations over
the last 20 to 30 years, writers (such as Scott and Lodge, 1985, and
Lodge and Vogel, 1987) have pointed to the very different
emphasis to the creation and the distribution of wealth by the US
and UK governments, compared with that given by the Japanese
and German governments. I will say no more on this issue, save to
observe that the growing imperative of countries to be competitive
in world markets - to maintain, let alone advance the living
standards of their constituents - is requiring an increasing
proportion of their resources to be directed to competitive
enhancing activities; and it is this realisation which is compelling
some administrations to reappraise some of their spending
programmes and the means of financing them.
The second, and least controversial, reason why
governments intervene in markets is because they perceive that the
terms and conditions of exchange are being distorted by the
conduct of one or more of the participants in the market - or of
foreign governments. Such structural market impurities essentially
result from the monopolistic, or monopsonistic behaviour, on the
part of producers or consumers, although sometimes the desire to
eradicate these distortions gets confused with the debate of
whether some markets, e.g., those for education, housing, rail
transport and health should preform a social as well as an
economic function. Inter alia, this ambivalence of objectives
explains why state run sectors are often uncompetitive. Here the
concept of the social market economy becomes relevant, although
in recent years, this concept has been widened to embrace other
kinds of market failure.
National governments possess a plethora of instruments to
deal with structural market failures - most of which are directed to
making markets more contestable, and to inhibiting one group of
participants from exploiting such economic power as they may have
at the expense of other groups. Anti-trust policies represent the
kernel of such instruments. In so far as the globalisation of
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economic activity intensifies competition between firms, the
intervention of governments may be less necessary. But, more
relevant is the fact that technological and organisafional advances
that such globalisafion is shifting the main locus of inter-firm rivalry
from being intra-national to being international.
At the same time, market structures are becoming more
complex as firms both compete and collaborate with each other.
The growth of cross-border strategic business alliances has been
one of the most dramatic phenomenon of the last decade. Such
alliances as the design and production of a supersonic aircraft, or a
new generation of computers, are usually intended to accomplish a
very specific purpose and, while some observers are concerned lest
they are an excuse for monopolistic behaviour, the general
consensus is that many help protect or advance the global
competitive positions of the participating firms.
The British government is, in fact, currently encouraging
transatlantic alliances between small to medium size firms.
However, the point I want to particularly underline is that one
government’s attitude- vis-a-vis that of another government
competing for the same resources - towards the increased
oligopolistic structure of transnational production and the
conclusion of cross-border mergers and alliances, may decisively
affect both the incentive and capabilities of its domestically based
firms to service foreign markets, and the locafional options open to
foreign based MNEs (or increase their investments) in that country.
The mould of competition policy which is suitable to a closed economy may
need to be recast in a global economy. At the same time, to discourage
governments from using their competition policies to achieve goals
other than those addressed by an efficient market system, some
kind of supra-national surveillance may be necessary where other
governments are promoting economic strategies which are
structurally distorting. I shall return to this point a little later.
Let me now turn to the third justification for governments
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to intervene in the way markets allocate resources; and one which I
believe globalisation is forcing a major reassessment of the whole
ethos of their macro-organisational strategies. This is to overcome,
or to counteract, what I have referred to elsewhere (Dunning,
1993a and 1993b) as endemic or pervasive market failure; the word
endemic meaning that the very nature of market conditions in
which goods and services are bought and sold, rather than the
behaviour of the participants, does not permit it to optimally fulfil
its functions. Two reasons are commonly adduced. The first
reflects the costs required to create and sustain an efficient market.
Economists refer to these costs as transaction costs; but, de facto, they
include all expenditures which have to be incurred to ensure that
the buyers and sellers in the market have the knowledge and
incentive to behave as they would in a situation of perfect
competition.
The second reason is that, in contrast to the assumptions of
neo-classical economic theory, individual markets - be they product,
labour or financial markets - are not always self-contained,
independent entities, but are complementary to, and
interdependent of, each other. The main implication of this
interdependence is that a particular transaction may affect, for
good or bad, the welfare of individuals or institutions other than
those involved in that transaction. These are the so called
externalities of markets. Sometimes in their evaluation of the
efficiency of markets, analysts distinguish between private costs and
benefits (i.e., those incurred or enjoyed by the transacting parties to
an exchange) and social costs and benefits, viz those enjoyed by the
wider community. To give just one example; it has been calculated
(by some economists19) that the average social returns to R&D
exceed those appropriated by the investing firms by 50 per cent -
100 per cent.
The literature provides countless examples of situations in
19 See especially Aaron and Schultze (1992).
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which endemic market failure is likely to flourish. Broadly speaking,
these fall into two main groups. The first relate to characteristics of
the goods or services being transacted; and the second to the
conditions under which they are exchanged. Of the former,
products whose production requires assets with a high level of
specificity (or start-up) to variable costs of production (i.e., capital
or technology intensive products); products the demand for which
or supply of which is inelastic, uncertain or unstable; products, the
supply of which is subject to substantial economies of scale or
whose value rests on strict quality control; products which are more
valuable if they are used jointly with other products; and products
the output or use of which generates substantial external
economies or costs (e.g., environmentally sensitive products).
As to market specific transaction costs, these are frequently
the outcome of imperfections in interpersonal relationships,
information asymmetries and inappropriate macro-organisational
policies. They include country related political and economic
uncertainties; the inadequacy of the legal or regulatory system with
respect, e.g., to contract enforcement and protection of property
rights; exchange risks; unacceptable or misunderstood business
practices; undemanding consumer attitudes towards product
improvement and quality; abrasive work and worker-management
relationships; and the failure of government to adequately
acknowledge or cope with endemic market failure.
It may not have escaped your notice that the products
which possess the characteristics just identified - or, to put it
another way, when produced and sold through the market, incur
substantial relational and transaction costs - are the output of
created assets. They are also products which are currently
predominantly supplied by large firms - though, because of
telecommunication advances and the opportunities offered by
strategic alliances, are likely to be increasingly provided by small to
medium size corporations; and the conditions of their production
are markedly influenced by the actions of national governments.
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They are products the supply of which tends to increase
proportionately as a country moves along its development path.
They are also trade and FDI intensive; while the markets for them
vary in their degree of imperfection according to the location of
the participants involved. Finally, they are the products at the
forefront of globalisation, which, to be produced efficiently, often
require the use of complementary assets.
Economic theory suggests that there are three main
responses to market failure. The first is for firms to internalise
intermediate product markets by the vertical integration of value
chains or the horizontal diversification of products or processes.
Such action may either lower or increase economic welfare,
depending on whether it is prompted by the desire of the
internalising firms to raise economic efficiency or to advance
monopoly power (Teece, 1986, Dunning, 1988). An example of the
former case is where a hierarchy internalises a market to lower its
transaction costs or to exploit the economies of scale or scope. This
is likely to be welfare raising, especially where the firm is faced with
competition in the less idiosyncratic factor or intermediate goods
markets, and in the final goods or services markets. On the other
hand, a hostile takeover could be prompted by the desire of the
acquiring firm to eliminate a competitor and engage in market
distorting practices.
The second response to market failure is for the
participants in the market - sometimes assisted by non-participants -
to try to reduce that failure. For example, quality variation and an
inability of subcontractors to adhere to delivery dates might be
reduced by a closer and more productive working relationship
between the buying firms and their suppliers; while, by reducing
macro-economic uncertainties and removing market inhibiting
governmental practices, e.g., discriminatory purchasing
procedures, transaction costs might be lowered.
The third solution is for governments or some other extra-
market institutions (e.g., groups of firms) to counteract the
intrinsic deficiencies of the market by offering producers and
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consumers inducements to behave as if a perfect market existed.
Examples include the provision of tax concessions and subsidies to
increase the private benefits of R&D and training to the level of
their social benefits; improving information about the export
opportunities for small firms; setting up investment guarantee
schemes to protect outbound MNEs against political risks; making
certain that patent legislation and procedures properly reflect the
needs of innovators; assisting the market in its provision of risk
capital - especially for projects which are likely to generate social
benefits and are long-term in their gestation; and ensuring directly
or indirectly, that the transaction or "hassle" costs of doing business
-e.g., industrial disputes, inadequate transport and communication
facilities and time consuming bureaucratic controls are kept to the
minimum.
Each of us can, undoubtedly, think of many other examples
of endemic market shortcomings, but most, I suspect, would reduce
to the presence of X inefficiency of one kind or another. But, there
is another aspect of market failure which economists are apt to
neglect, mainly because they tend to assume human beings behave
in a consistent and rational manner and are only interested in the
pursuance of wealth. But - one might question - is this a realistic
interpretation of why individuals and institutions engage in market
transactions? Organisational theorists question this, and talk about
the bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour of producers
and consumers; and about the homo psychologicus of cognitive
psychology as compared with the homo economicus of economics.90
! would like to extend this idea of psychological man to the
mentality or culture of wealth creating activities by countries and
corporations. Even the most cursory glance at the ways in which
(say) the Arab countries, and the Germans conduct day to day
business; or the attitudes of the Japanese and Nigerians to inter-
firm relationships and contractual obligations; or the ethos of work
20 As, for example, explored by Williamson (1992).
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and leisure of the Taiwanese and Greeks; or the perceived
responsibilities and duties of workers, business managers and
governments of the Koreans, Chileans and Russians - or the cross-
border operational and organisational strategies of Nissan and
Toyota or Motorola and Texas Instruments - reveals wide
differences in the culture or ideology of wealth creating behaviour.
The globalising economy is unearthing a new importance to
concepts such as trust, forbearance and reciprocity; and of
informal, rather than formal, organisational forms in affecting
national competitiveness, and, hence, the disposition of resources
and capabilities.
The extent to which the culture of wealth creating
behaviour is an intrinsic characteristic of a country or corporation
or can be shaped by exposure to other cultures, by decree or
economic pressure, or by a reorientation of personal or business
values, is debatable. But, surely there can be little doubt that the
forces of globalisation are compelling firms and governments to
review their respective roles in influencing mental attitudes towards
wealth creating activities. Whether we like it or not, the trade-offs
between these and other activities, such as leisure pursuits, are
changing; and, whether we like it or not, to a large extent, they are
being set by countries which value competitiveness the highest. The
grasshopper’s attitude to life is fine as long as the grasshoppers do
not aspire to the living standards of the ant. The trouble is that
most of us want to retain our lifestyles of work and leisure, but also
enjoy all the material benefits of our economically more successful
neighbours.
Here, again, I believe governments have a critical role to
play, both as information providers to their constituents about the
real costs of not being competitive in an open world economy; and
in helping to create a culture or psychology of economic behaviour
which encourages, rather than discourages, competitiveness. Much
more contentious is the extent to which some culturally related
work practices are perceived to be the "unacceptable face of
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competitiveness". Why should British, or American, or Dutch textile
workers be expected to have their wages or working conditions
reduced to the level nearer their counterparts in Bangladesh or Sri
Lanka - or lose their jobs? Although the question of harmonising
cross-country cultures of work and wealth creating activities is not
yet on the political agenda of countries, it is not far below the
surface, and is likely to become an increasing talking point as
globalisation impels governments to reappraise their attitudes on
this issue.
Of course, the culture of economic behaviour does not start
or end with the work ethic. A no less - and perhaps, a more
important consideration - and one which is in line with the
principle of comparative dynamic advantage - is for a country
threatened by low labour cost competitiveness to upgrade or
restructure its resource usage and efficiency. Governments again
can play a decisive part not just by providing the right kind of
market enabling incentives and structural adjustment assistance
(Ozawa, 1987), but by encouraging - and be seen to be encouraging
- an ethos of entrepreneurship and innovation; a readiness by
enterprises to anticipate and take advantage of technical and
economic change; and an appreciation by workers of the need for
job restructuring and retraining.
If what I have said is familiar in an audience of this kind, I
do not think it is generally acknowledged. And, this, primarily, is
because the average Westerner’s perception of the appropriate
tasks of government is 50 to 100 years out of date. Part of the
reason is, most certainly, a cultural or ideological one - compare,
for example, a Christian with an Islamic or Confucian viewpoint of
such issues as personal initiative, authority and collective
responsibility; but, part is because Western governments have not
seen the need for, or have had the political will to, recast the mould
of their economic responsibilities. Some recent contributions by
scholars have urged governments to reappraise their
philosophies21 - but these are not helped by analysts who continue
21 See especially those identified in footnote 18, page 18 and Dunning (1992).
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to preach a minimal role for governments, or encourage a "them"
and "us" attitude between private firms and the public sector; with
the former being perceived as the wealth creators and the latter as
the profligate spenders of that created wealth.
The core task of government as an enabler or facilitator of
wealth creation is not yet appealing to most people. The reality - as
opposed to the idea - of a partnership between government, firms
and individuals in enhancing competitiveness remains mainly
confined to East Asian nations. The suggestion that the globalised
economy demands a fundamental rethinking of the "how, "why"
and "wherefore" of the organisation of government, as it does of
firms, fails to gain little support. For the most part, political
scientists and economists either assert that governments should not
involve themselves at all in macro-organisational affairs, or that they
should play a direct and activist interventionist role in shaping or
manipulating markets to better meet perceived social and
economic needs.
Yet, de facto, the rhetoric of government ministers is often
far removed from the practice. To take one example; in her time at
10 Downing Street, Mrs Thatcher constantly applauded the virtues
of the free market. Yet, a reading of her record suggests that she
was one of the most interventionist of Prime Ministers - if one uses
the word interventionist to include any and every action taken by a
government which might affect the competitiveness of the
resources under its jurisdiction. But somehow, either out of
ignorance, lethargy, or for some reason best known to themselves,
right wing politicians seem reluctant to acknowledge that such
actions as tax hikes, environmental regulations, a new educational
curricula, attitudes towards monopolies, investment in roads,
energy policies, regional development, health care programmes,
industrial relations legislation and the finance of universities - all
affect competitiveness just as much as direct intervention (mainly
via industrial policy) in the allocation and use of resources. And
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Ocertainly, there seems little appreciation of how these policies
interact with each other; hence, there is no holistic or systemic
approach to them.
I do not want to press my critique of western governments
too far. In several countries, there is a growing recognition that the
globalising economy is compelling an up-scaling of industrial
competitiveness on the political agenda, and a reappraisal of
traditional macro-organisational strategies. Issues such as training,
the funding of R&D, information and advice for small businesses,
competition policy, attitudes towards inward investment, new road
and rail links and so on are being increasingly viewed and evaluated
in terms of their perceived impact on competitiveness. But, for the
most part, most of the action so far taken by Western governments
has been ad hoc, uncoordinated and fragmentary; and as an "add-
on" to existing policies, rather than part of a systemic remoulding
of the organisational structure of decision taking so that itmay best
embrace the challenges and opportunities of a globalising
economy.
To some extent, the problem is educating the decision
takers in government. Here, the fault partly lies with academics
such as ourselves. We have just not got over the message that there
is a fundamental difference between the kind of government action
necessary to help overcome endemic market failure and to
facilitate the upgrading of resources and capabilities, and that
which seeks to replace or modify the behaviour of firms in the
belief that central planning can do a better job in advancing
economic and social welfare than can markets. We have not got
over the message that, to optimise their efficiency and response to
market signals, firms require the availability of created assets and a
wealth creating ethos which only governments can provide. We
have not got over the message that increasingly what governments
do and how they do it, is much more important than how much
government involvement should there beI
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To some extent, too, the problem is one of re-forming
opinions and attitudes towards the role of governments. I believe
we need a new vocabulary to promote the image of government as
a public good rather than as a necessary evil. We need a
"perestroika" of government. We need to recognise that, just as
"Fordism" is an out-dated method of organising work, so the kind
of government interventionism appropriate to a "Fordist"
environment is outdated. And, just like the emerging managerial
structure of 21st century firms, we need governments to be lean,
flexible and anticipatory of change. The new paradigm of
government should eschew such negative or emotive sounding
words such as "command", "intervention", "regulation", and
replace them by words such as "empower", "steer", "co-operative",
"co-ordination" and "systemic". Moreover, not only must
governments recognise the need for a much more integrated and
holistic system of organising their responsibilities, which demands a
"spider’s web" rather than a "hub and spoke" relationship between
the various decision taking departments and the core of
government, viz the cabinet of the Prime Minister or President
(Dunning, 1992); but, for all those affected by governments, and
particularly the ordinary tax payers, to take a more positive view of
the benefits which only the former can produce.
It would be an entirely other lecture to suggest how the
organisation of governments should change to accommodate the
kind of remoulding I have articulated. But, this issue is now very
much being considered in the literature. In a recent contribution
with the intriguing title Transforming the Dinosaurs, Douglas Hague
(Hague, 1993) has identified four ways in which institutions - be
they public or private - can re-engineer themselves, viz by coercion,
contagion, coaching and learning. While the latter three are usually
more acceptable agents of change than the first; in practice, such
change usually has to wait until some kind of crisis coerces action.
While Hague’s remarks are primarily addressed to the UK situation,
they would strike a chord of sympathy with the business leaders of
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Japan who, last April, made a powerful plea for a radical redesign
of the central administrative structure of the Japanese government.
Among other things, they argued for a greater degree of co-
ordination between the different ministries and agencies of the
executive; and for a flattening of the pyramidal system of decision
taking. Unless this is done - and done efficiently - then, according
to the Keidaren -Japan’s economic future may be put at risk.
We do not wish to imply that actions taken by national
governments to overcome or reduce market failure are costless, or
that such actions are necessarily the most cost effective way of
achieving that objective.22 At the same time, it is possible to
identify the kind of situations which favour government
intervention of one kind or another. Exhibit 1, which is derived
and adapted from Robert Wade’s evaluation of the role played by
national administrations in fostering the economic development of
Japan, Taiwan and Korea (Wade, 1988) sets out some of these
situations, and the ways in which they may help reduce the
transaction costs of governance.
While the data in Exhibit 1 are fairly self-explanatory, and
provide a set of guidelines for governmental intervention, they
have not yet been subject to rigorous scrutiny by scholars.
22 Panong the possible failures of direct government intervention to successfully
overcome the deficiencies of the market, one might mention the rent seeking
activities of powerful pressure groups; the magnification of market failures (e.g.,
with respect to the supply of environmental or social products) by the news media or
other politically motivated interests; the inability of governments to attract the best
talents (due inter alia to ineffective incentive systems); the lack of commercial
expertise and bounded rationality of public decision takers; the pursuance of non-
economic (especially ideological) goals by politicians; the inadequacy of market
related performance indicators which may lead to the establishment of sub-optimal
standards (e.g., with respect to budgets, investment and control of information
llows); file high-time discount (or short-termism) of political decision takers; the
lack of market pressures to minimise X inefficiency, especially in the case of public
monopolies; uncertainties and ambiguities inherent in the provision of goods and
services, which are in the domain of governments, e.g., defense equipment,
educational and health services; and the lack of ~/co-ordinated system of governance
(c.f. with that in c~e of private hierarchies); and the difficulty of adjusting policies
and institutional structures to quickly meet the needs of technological and
economic change. For a more detailed examination of these and other factors which
might lead to excessive or inappropriate governmental intervention or the
suboptimal provision of public goods and services, see for example Wolf (1988),
Grestchmann (1991), Stiglitz (1989) and Hfimfilfiinen (1994).
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The globalising economy may well enhance the need for such a
scrutiny, as it increases the costs of misinformed or inappropriate
government action.
6 Multilateral Action
I cannot end my presentation without at least the briefest of
mentions of the implications of globalisation for the existing supra-
national regimes of governance. If my thesis that governments are
increasingly competing with each other for resources and markets
to maintain or increase their living standards is correct; and, if,’de
facto, such competition tends to be oligopolistic, then, there is a
real danger that the strategic rent seeking measures taken by
individual governments might lead to a situation not unlike the
"beggar my neighbour" restrictive trade policies of the inter-war
years. For the last 40 years, GATT has helped set the rules of the
game for trade. But, today the playing field of international
competition is structured very differently. As we have argued in this
presentation, it embraces many policy instruments of governments,
which as much affect the capabilities of nations trade and compete
with each other, just as much as the conditions underlying trade per
Se.
And, it is in pursuance of industrial, technology, taxation
and competition strategies to advance national interests where the
level of the playing fields is currently the most uneven. Again, inter
alia, because of their unique business cultures, different countries
have different interpretations of the fairness or otherwise of
government interventions; hence - to give just one example - the
strategic initiative talks between Japan and the US have been
designed to try to reconcile some of the differences between the
two nations in their interpretations of the legitimacy of government
enabling measures.
The next decade is likely to see much written about the
remoulding of international institutions such as GATT, the World
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Exhibit 1: Some Examples of Situations in which Governments might Successfully Contain their own Organisational Costs
Intervention or Form of Government Intervention Consequences for the Reduction of Government Related
Transaction Costs
° The enhancement of national competitiveness by market
facilitating measures; and publicly promoting this objective
° The containment of interventionist policies to activities
severely hampered by market failures
° A holistic approach to the co-ordination of complementary
policies and institutional mechanisms
° An ethos of consensus and co-operation between private and
public policy makers, e.g., with respect to mutually beneficial
goals and the means by which goals can best be achieved
° The recruitment of the most talented and well motivated
individuals for public sector employment, e.g., by offering
competitive working conditions and encouraging initiative
and entrepreneurship
° The insulation of the policy making process from the
strongest (andmost undesirable) pressure groups
° The presence of a national ethos or mentality of the need to
be competitive and create wealth. Partly, this embraces a
"commutarian" culture and partly one which encourages
personal initiative, entrepreneurship, scientific specialisation
and competition
° The absence of strong sectoral interest groups, e.g., farmers
and left-wing labour groups, which might press for
interventionist measures by governments other than those
which are market facilitating
° Reduces effectiveness of rent seeking special interest groups
° Increases work effort of public agents
° Makes policy trade-offs easier to identify and solve
* Clarifies policy makers’task and reduces problem of bounded
rationality
° Reduces likelihood of sub-optimisation
* Captures economies of scope in governance and increases
intra-organisational information flows and learning
° Reduces transaction costs of interaction between
representatives of private and public sector
* Increases knowledge of public decision takers
° Reduces chance of uninformed or biased media coverage in
forcing governments into ill advised or hasty decisions
° Likely to inhibit the pursuance of sub-optimal goals and to
reduce bounded rationality and opportunism and use of
inefficient prodt~ction technologies
° Reduces the effectiveness of rent seeking by special interest
groups, and relieves the policy making process from the
pressure of day to day politics
° Favours coordination of strategies and policies of public and
private organisations and reduces the sub-optimisation
problem in the public sector
* Reduces possibility of ideological conflicts and undue
emphasis being placed on the redistribution of incomes as a
(short term) social good
Sources:Wage (1988), Stiglitz (1989), Grestchmann (1991), HfimfdSJnen (1994).
Bank, IMF and the UN so that they can better cope with the
problems of globalisation - including those occasioned by the
dictates of MNEs - which cannot easily be tackled or solved at a
national, or even a regional, level.2~ Again, the role of national
governments in championing their own causes will be a critical one.
But, just as we have argued today, the kinds of restructuring of the
organisation of markets and firms demanded by globalisation is
impelling national governments to redesign their world of
governance; so, too, the functions and authority of international
institutions may need to be reconsidered if globalisation is to offer
the fullest possible benefits - which a free exchange of people,
goods and services demands.
23 For an examination of some of the issues involved, see particularly Ostry (1990),
Preston and Windsor (1992) and Bergsten and Graham (1992).
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